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THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE: 
A UNITED STATES/CARIBBEAN 
TRADE REVIVAL 
by Alicia Drummey 
I. Introduction 
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is one 
of the Reagan Administration's major foreign 
economic directives, and yet the general public 
seems to know very little about it. The CBI is 
an innovative program in which American busi-
esses set up operations through direct invest-
ment in Caribbean nations and export the 
products of these operations duty-free to the 
United States. This allows participating U.S. 
companies to not only boost their revenues and 
profits by taking advantage of the lower costs of 
Caribbean labor but also to meet the challenge 
of Japanese and European competition by of-
fering lower-cost products. The CBI has the po-
tential to aid Caribbean nations by providing 
many jobs, thereby reducing high unemploy-
ment rates and boosting their economies. 
This paper provides an analytical overview 
of the CBI. The first parts of the paper will give 
a detailed economic background of the Carib-
bean and its relation to the United States. The 
paper will then discuss the rules and provisions 
of the CBI, and the final sections will evaluate 
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the effects of the CBI on both the Caribbean 
and United States economies. 
II . The Caribbean Economy in the 1980s 
Since the penetration of European influ-
ence into the Caribbean some 300 years ago, 
Caribbean nations have tended towards social 
and economic fragmentation. This is a result of 
their longtime dependence on European "met-
ropoles" (mother countries of colonies, such as 
France and England). The exclusive nature of 
this relationship between a Caribbean colony 
and its metropole did not foster interdepend-
ence among Caribbean countries but rather 
caused fierce competition for resources, with 
one country often gaining at the expense of 
another (Palmer, p. llO). 
The severity of this competition has greatly 
diminished in recent years, but Caribbean na-
tions still remain largely dependent on metro-
pole economies, even after becoming politically 
independent iQ the 1940s. During this period 
the United States economy expanded dramatic-
ally, encouraging multinational firms to invest 
heavily in Caribbean mineral industries. This 
surge in trade between the U.S. and Caribbean 
started the U.S. on its way to being a major 
trading partner with the Caribbean. However, 
the trade situation has only added to Caribbean 
dependency and has thus created additional 
difficulties for Caribbean economies (Palmer, 
p. 1). 
A. Economic Problems of the Caribbean 
One particularly serious problem is the 
two-way flow of capital between the U.S. and 
the Caribbean. An inward flow of debt and 
equity capital to the Caribbean has been fi-
nanced largely by an outward flow of invest-
ment income from the Caribbean to the U.S. In 
effect, the typical Caribbean country is engaged 
in a cycle with the U.S. in which it in effect sup-
plies much of the foreign capital which it re-
ceives (Palmer, p. 70). 
Very little of this investment income has 
been reinvested in the Caribbean. For exam-
ple, between 1966 and 1976, the U.S. repatri-
ated 96% of total earnings ($865 million) from 
Jamaican industry leaving only 4% for Jamaica. 
This percentage is extremely low in comparison 
with the standard 31.5% of the U.S. foreign in-
vestment earnings reinvested in developing 
countries and the 53% reinvested in developed 
countries (Palmer, p. 71). 
This small share of reinvested earnings is a 
serious problem because it does not provide 
Caribbean countries with the funds needed to 
service their government debt, funds which 
would enable them to reduce their dependency 
on the U.S. for debt capital. 
A second way in which the Caribbean is 
dependent upon the U.S. is through its curren-
cy (Palmer, p. 49). Caribbean currency is di-
rectly tied to the U.S. dollar. Therefore, the 
Caribbean operates on a dual exchange-rate 
system. For example, the recent sharp increase 
in the value of the U.S. dollar against European 
currencies has made Caribbean exports to 
Europe more expensive and Caribbean imports 
from Europe cheaper. Thus trade prospects of 
the Caribbean economies are determined main-
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ly by U.S. factors and not by their own circum-
stances. 
Certain adverse developments in the world 
economy in the late 1970s have caused further 
problems for the Caribbean countries. The 
main sources of income for these nations are 
commodities such as sugar, bauxite, and coffee 
and tourism. However, the first three commod-
ities are so tied to international markets that 
the Caribbean economies themselves have little 
control over pricing and demand. In the 1970s, 
the prices for these basic export crops, 
especially coffee, fell dramatically (Dam, 1983). 
In addition, the oil shocks of the 1970s not on-
ly raised energy costs but also sharply reduced 
the number of tourists because of higher air 
fares. Furthermore, the higher cost of capital 
which resulted from high real interest rates in 
the U.S. made borrowing very expensive and, 
in many cases, infeasible. 
Although many of these problems have 
been alleviated by the world economic recovery 
of the 1980s, most Caribbean nations have ex-
perienced severe difficulties in making a full 
economic recovery. 
Many Caribbean governments have re-
sponded too slowly and, in some cases, quite 
inappropriately to these problems. Some have, 
for example, implemented government controls 
on prices which have in turn hindered econom-
ic growth (Dam, 1983). Since market equilibri-
um prices have often been in excess of what the 
poorer classes can afford, the resort to such 
price controls on the part of governments has 
been increasingly common. The creation of 
controls has led to the establishment of bu-
reaucracies to implement them-bureaucracies 
which consume limited administrative resources 
which might be better used for other purposes 
(Palmer, p. 60). 
In addition to the problems caused by gov-
ernmental controls, social and political con-
flicts have often led to instability and repres-
sion. The benefits of the Caribbean economic 
expansion of the 1960s and early 1970s were 
distributed inequitably across society but never-
theless caused generally rising aspirations 
which could not always be fulfilled. Pressures 
for broader political participation increased in 
many countries, yet there were few democratic 
outlets through which these pressures could be 
relieved peacefully. For example, in Jamaica re-
cent increases in the prices of gasoline, cook-
ing gas, and electricity have led to widespread 
economic unrest. Economic-related crimes, 
such as robbery, are occurring more frequently, 
and reports of increased police brutality raise 
fears of further repression (Crosette, p. 58). 
Still another problem which Caribbean na-
tions face concerns employment. Chronic labor 
shortages exist in most of the skilled occupa-
tions and professions because of the heavy vol-
ume of migration to non-Caribbean nations (es-
pecially the United States). At the same time, 
there is widespread unemployment in the un-
skilled and semiskilled occupations because of 
industry's inability to absorb a large portion of 
this workforce (Palmer, p. 97). 
Lastly, the problems of the region have 
been exacerbated by the occurrence of guerril-
la warfare in nearby Central America. Particu-
larly in El Salvador, guerrillas have caused dis-
ruptions in transportation and water supplies 
and have forced the closing of factories , the 
abandonment of farms, and the displacement 
of thousands of workers (Dam, 1983). This has 
tended to create a negative psychological cli-
mate, thus discouraging even further much 
needed foreign investment. 
In sum, there is the serious question 
whether these small, relatively unindustrialized 
Caribbean nations can overcome such substan-
tial economic and political problems and be-
come independent and successful. Should they 
fail at this attempt, they are in very real danger 
of experiencing even greater political turmoil, 
as has already transpired in several Central 
American countries. 
B. Caribbean Economic Strategies for 
Recovery 
Caribbean leaders have of course recog-
nized the dangers alluded to above and have 
been evaluating various economic remedies. 
One way in which some Caribbean countries 
have tried to improve their economic condi-
tions and avoid the plight of many of their Cen-
tral American neighbors is through soliciting 
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direct investment by multinational firms. How-
ever, the Caribbean people have often expressed 
dissatisfaction with both the quality and quanti-
ty of multinational corporations' contributions 
to the social and economic development of the 
Caribbean under "traditional" ownership ar-
rangements (Palmer, p. 7). For example, an ex-
porting subsidiary has little, if any, control over 
prices. Royalties, licensing fees for technology, 
and interest charges on loans are determined 
by the parent firm and are often inflated to in-
crease the cost of the subsidiary to the parent 
firm, thereby reducing the latter's tax liability. 
In general, the Caribbean peoples' past exper-
ience with multinational corporations has led 
them to fear the undermining of their sover-
eignty. 
Another problem with investment arrange-
ments of the past concerns the transfer of tech-
nology. Since the managerial and operational 
technology of the metropole country is often 
required of its foreign subsidiaries, a Caribbean 
country may have to invest tremendous amounts 
of capital to accommodate this technology 
(Palmer, p. 40). The upgrading of transporta-
tion and communications facilities is just one 
obvious example in this regard. 
In order to deal more effectively with these 
problems, the Commonwealth Caribbean, an 
economic coalition of Caribbean countries, has 
been established. The Commonwealth has em-
braced two goals through which it hopes to im-
prove the economic condition of the region. 
The first is to reduce the Caribbean 's consider-
able dependence on the metropole countries. 
The second is to retain for local development a 
larger share of the economic surplus produced 
by locally-based foreign enterprises (Palmer, 
p. 6). 
These goals can be attained in a number of 
possible suggested ways, one of which is the 
joint-venture approach. Joint ventures allow 
local companies a greater share in profits while 
enabling them to retain more effective control 
over the flow of capital, technology, manage-
ment, and marketing to areas for development. 
Another solution which has been suggested is 
an increase in the number of state-controlled 
industries. This would have the advantage of 
permitting a greater retention of profits for 
local and regional development; however, a 
movement to state controlled industry would 
also lead to an increase in bureaucracy, which 
might further inhibit economic growth (Palmer, 
p. 60). Also, transfer of control to local govern-
ments would not protect the Caribbean from 
the possible reactions on the part of metropole 
governments to protect their countries' invest-
ments. A third solution-one which has re-
ceived the most attention-is that of regional 
integration, a strategy which would unite all 
Caribbean nations through economic coopera-
tion and cultural and diplomatic exchange. Re-
gional integration could aid Caribbean coun-
tries by pooling resources, reducing duplication 
of economic activities, and decreasing competi-
tion for resources and trade. 
Despite the feelings that over-reliance on 
metropoles has created many problems, it may 
still be the case that metropoles have an im-
portant role to play in the economic recovery of 
the Caribbean nations. This is due largely to 
the current trend for metropoles to set up man-
ufacturing in third world countries because of 
the lower costs of labor. According to Kevin 
Power of the New York Times, fully 30% of the 
world's manufactured goods will come from 
third world economies by the year 2000. This 
means that competition between these econo-
mies for a share in world trade will soon intensi-
fy. If Caribbean nations act soon to rebuild 
their economies and establish trade ties, they 
may have a chance to establish a competitive 
"edge" over other developing countries. 
III. Importance Of The Caribbean To The 
u.s. 
From the perspective of the United States, 
there are many reasons why the Caribbean is 
an attractive and practical place to invest. First 
of all, investing in the Caribbean can mean sav-
ings for U.S. companies because of the lower 
costs of labor there. The average minimum 
wage in the Caribbean as of 1983 is $.42 per 
hour (plus about 20% in government-mandated 
fringe benefits). Wages in light manufacturing 
begin at approximately $1 an hour, and skilled 
workers receive between $2.50 and $4.50 an 
36 
hour plus fringe benefits (Business America, 
1983, p. 37). These labor costs are of course 
considerably lower than those in the U.S. and a 
potential source of cost savings which could be 
passed on to the U.S. consumer via lower 
prices. Setting up operations in the Caribbean 
as opposed to an overseas country in some 
other region of the world could also result in 
substantial transportation and communication 
savings because of the proximity of the Carib-
bean to the U.S. The combination of these two 
cost savings could thus enable U.S. firms to 
compete in the home market more effectively 
with Far East rivals. 
Another substantial benefit of investing in 
the Caribbean Basin is the duty-free access to 
European markets which is provided by the 
Lome Convention Treaty. This treaty was signed 
by both the ten member-states of the European 
community and by twelve Caribbean nations 
(Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago). It provides duty-free access for Carib-
bean goods to both the U.S. and Europe 
(Bateman, p. 29). 
Lastly, the U.S. government feels that the 
establishment of strong, friendly relationships 
with Caribbean countries is vital to the security 
of the United States, since about half of crude 
oil imports to the U.S. pass through the sea 
lanes of the Panama Canal. Several countries 
in the Caribbean Basin, such as Nicaragua, 
Grenada, Guatemala, and El Salvador, are cur-
rently undergoing considerable political unrest. 
This makes them particularly susceptible to 
Cuban , and hence communist, influence. Many 
U.S. policymakers feel that if the U.S. can 
establish an atmosphere of friendly economic 
interchange, the threat of communist influence 
and political unrest will be reduced (Dam , 
1983). 
Because increased competition from the 
Far East and the fear of Caribbean political un-
rest have renewed U.S. interest in doing busi-
ness with the Caribbean, the Reagan adminis-
tration in 1982 established the framework for 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, a novel trade 
plan between American businesses and Carib-
bean countries. Following negotiations with 
Caribbean leaders and American labor and 
after eighteen months of debate and delibera-
tion in Congress, the CBI was adopted and 
went into effect on January 1, 1984. Its major 
provisions will be summarized in the section 
which follows. 
IV. The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Rules 
And Provisions 
The essence of the CBI is the creation of 
one-way, duty-free access for the products of 
firms located in Caribbean nations to the 
United States market for a period of twelve 
years. This duty-free access provides the Carib-
bean participants with a relatively more recep-
tive market in the U.S. for their goods since 
importing Caribbean products is made less ex-
pensive. Such access also helps participating 
U.S. companies to lower their costs, thereby 
strengthening their domestic market positions. 
Most products exported from the Carib-
bean region are eligible for this duty-free treat-
ment except for a few which, for various political 
reasons, have been excluded. Some of these 
products have been excluded to protect ailing 
American industries such as the textile, ap-
parel, footwear and certain leather products in-
dustries. Petroleum and petroleum products 
are also excluded because of the excess capacity 
of domestic refineries and the United States' 
desire to reduce dependence on foreign oil. 
Sugar receives duty-free treatment, but only up 
to certain quota limits which were established 
to maintain the U.S. domestic sugar price sup-
port program. Yet another product excluded 
from duty-free treatment is tuna. This exclusion 
is designed to protect the interests of two 
American protectorates, Puerto Rico and 
American Samoa. The dropping of the current 
35% tariff on tuna, the main export of these 
protectorates, would seriously harm their do-
mestic industries. 
The CBI has established many provisions 
to insure the adherence to its goals and to pro-
tect the rights of its participants. For example, 
to insure that the production of goods con-
tributes to the revitalization of the Caribbean 
economies, several production requirements 
have been set. One such requirement is that a 
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product must be imported directly from the 
beneficiary country. Another is that 35% of the 
labor performed on the product must be per-
formed in the Caribbean. Also, 15% of the total 
value of the product must come from U .S.-made 
components. Furthermore, any product which 
contains foreign components must be trans-
formed into a "new and different article of com-
merce" in at least one Caribbean country. 
(Report to the Committee on Ways and Means, 
1983). To protect the competitive position of 
Puerto Rico and other U.S. insular posses-
sions, the U.S. has increased the allowable per-
centage of foreign components in products 
shipped from these areas from the previous 
50% to 70% of the total value of the article. 
Also, the amount of alcoholic beverages eligi-
ble to receive duty-free treatment to the U.S. 
from its insular possessions has been increased 
so that such beverages might be price-competi-
tive with those exported duty-free from the 
Virgin Islands. 
Many other provisions of the CBI have 
been established which are specifically designed 
to protect various domestic United States in-
dustries. For example, emergency relief provi-
sions have been created to safeguard the U.S. 
agriculturai industry against a possible sudden 
influx of agricultural imports from the Carib-
bean. These relief provisions would effectively 
allow the President to restore the original tariff 
until a remedy could be effected. If the Presi-
dent finds that imports of products are materi-
ally interfering with a domestic price support 
program, then he can also impose import fees 
of up to 50% on those products. 
Yet another important provision of the 
CBI is an allowance for U.S. citizens to deduct 
from personal income taxes the expenses of at-
tending business conventions held in partici-
pating Caribbean countries. This measure is 
designed to encourage U.S. firms to hold more 
conventions in the Caribbean, thus stimulating 
their tourist trade. 
The CBI has established many guidelines 
for a Caribbean country's eligibility to par-
ticipate. A CBI participant country must: 
1) express desire to participate; 
2) have economic. political , and social con-
ditions which are conducive to produc-
tivity and investment; 
3) assure the United States that it will pro-
vide reasonable access to its markets 
and resources; 
4) follow accepted international trading 
rules; 
5) engage in trade policies with other CBI 
participants which contribute to revital-
izing the region; 
6) take self-help measures to foster eco-
nomic development; 
7) provide workers with reasonable work-
place conditions; 
8) have laws which provide effective means 
for foreign nations to secure intangible 
rights; 
9) prohibit copyright infringement (Report 
to the Committee on Ways and Means, 
1983). 
In addition , a CBI participant country cannot: 
1) be communist; 
2) have seized, nationalized, or expropri-
ated ownership or control of U.S. prop-
erty; 
3) fail to act in good faith towards awards 
in favor of a U.S. citizen; 
4) give preferential treatment to products 
of developing countries other than those 
with which the U.S. is associated unless 
the President deems it not adverse to 
U.S. commerce; 
5) violate U.S. copyrights; 
6) be signatory to an agreement regarding 
the extradition of U.S. citizens (Report 
to the Committee on Ways and Means, 
1983). 
The President has the authority to suspend or 
withdraw a country's right to participate in this 
program if this country no longer meets the 
criteria of acceptance. 
As of January 1, 1984, the majority of the 
eligible Caribbean countries have chosen to 
participate. 1 Six other countries (Anguilla, 
Bahamas, Caymans, Guyana, and the Turks 
and Caicos) are eligible to participate but still 
have not elected to do so at the time of this 
writing. 
Overall, the CBI is designed to achieve a 
variety of goals. Certainly the CBI can make 
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available to the U.S. producers and consumers 
relatively inexpensive and competitively priced 
goods. But it is also expected to promote U.S. 
strategic and economic interests, primarily in 
the area of the Panama Canal, by securing 
"friendly" neighbors. The CBI is also an at-
tempt to improve the economies of the Carib-
bean nations so as to alleviate the conditions 
which cause large numbers of people to im-
migrate from the Caribbean to the United 
States. Whether or not the CBI can achieve all 
these goals remains to be seen. 
V. The Potential Effectiveness of the CBI 
One potentially favorable effect of the CBI 
(provided that a sufficient number of U.S. com-
panies participate) is the alleviation of some of 
the Caribbean's labor problems. The CBI will 
cause a growth in the need for unskilled and 
semiskilled workers, thus reducing the substan-
tial level of unemployment in these job categor-
ies. The CBI may not bring skilled workers who 
have already emigrated back to the Caribbean, 
but it should serve to discourage more from 
leaving by providing opportunities for workers 
to obtain managerial and administrative posi-
tions within U.S./Caribbean firms. 
The CBI could also provide the opportun-
ity for Caribbean countries to take advantage of 
the recovery of the U.S. economy. Several po-
tentially profitable areas for promotion are 
electronics assembly, mining of marble and 
gypsum, light manufacturing, and winter vege-
table production. As an illustration, if tomato 
growers in the Caribbean Basin can meet U.S. 
standards on packaging and pesticides, they 
could benefit greatly by duty-free export of 
tomatoes to the U.S. during January and 
February, when fresh tomatoes are unavailable 
in the U.S. (Kantor, 1982, p. 31). 
Another way in which the CBI can provide 
substantial benefits to Caribbean countries is 
through the previously described convention 
tax provision. This provision could increase 
U.S. business travel in the region , thereby 
1 Antigua. Barbados. Belize. British Virgin Islands. 
Costa Rica. Dominica. the Dominican Republic. El 
Salvador. Grenada. Guatamala. Haiti. Honduras. Jamaica. 
Monscrrat. the Netherlands Antilles. Panama. St. 
Christopher Nevis. St. Lucia. and Trinidad and Tobago. 
stimulating tourism and the building of conven-
tion facilities, provided that the U.S. finances a 
large part of this upgrading. The Dominican 
Republic has already begun discussions with 
the U.S. in this regard, and several other coun-
tries have expressed an interest in doing the 
same. 
Since the CBI has only been in effect for a 
little more than one year at the time of this 
writing, it is too soon to subject it to a definitive 
evaluation. So far, however, U.S. businesses do 
not seem to be as attracted by the duty-free 
treatment of many products as the U.S. govern-
ment originally thought. This is due to the fact 
that approximately 3,000 products from the 
Caribbean and other developing countries 
around the world already receive duty-free 
treatment to the U.S. under the Generalized 
System of Preferences, an older U.S. trade pro-
gram (Farnsworth, 1984, p. 1). What the CBI 
has done so far, however, is to revive U.S. in-
terest in setting up operations in the Carib-
bean-an interest which seems to be stimulated 
primarily by the lower costs of unskilled and 
semi-skilled labor there. These lower labor 
costs, combined with duty-free access to the 
U.S. provided by the CBI, have the potential to 
yield great savings for U.S. companies. Already, 
Harowe Servo Controls, a maker of electronic 
motors, is saving an estimated $5,000 a month 
on imports of parts from St. Christopher and 
Nevis. MacGregor Sporting Goods projects sav-
ings of up to $150,000 in 1985 on Haitian-man-
ufactured basketballs and softballs. These 
savings can enable small-to-medium-sized com-
panies to make more competitive bids for their 
work and produce lower-priced goods. 
As of May 1984, approximately a dozen 
U.S. companies were in the process of moving 
to the Caribbean, and hundreds more were in 
the process of deciding on potential projects. 
The job creation effects of such projects are 
substantial. Harowe claims to have employed 
150 people in St. Christopher and Nevis and 
currently has plans to add 80 more. MacGregor 
Sporting Goods employs 200 workers to make 
basketballs in Haiti and plans to hire 800 more 
during 1985. In Grenada alone, fifteen U.S. 
firms are expected to invest $22.8 million in 
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projects which will ultimately create about 
1,600 jobs (Aim, 1984, p. 78). 
Not all U.S. investment in the Caribbean is 
related to manufacturing. Many U.S. invest-
ment efforts are designed to pave the way for 
future investment. For example, InterNorth, 
Inc. has established the Applied Technology 
Center in Jamaica to help its clients determine 
the potential for investment projects, and Con-
trol Data Caribbean Basin will match U.S. com-
panies with Caribbean companies in joint ven-
tures for marketing American knowledge of 
small business, education and training, and 
small-scale agriculture (Aim, 1984, p. 78). 
Increased U.S. participation in Caribbean 
industries has also led to a marked increase in 
exports to the U.S. According to the U.S. Com-
merce Department, Caribbean exports to the 
U.S. in January and February 1984 rose to $1.8 
billion, a 35% increase over sales for the same 
period in 1983. Barbados, the Dominican Re-
public, and Jamaica have each shown export 
gains of 100% or more from 1983 to 1984 due 
in part to the CBI as well as to the United 
States economic recovery (Aim, 1984, p. 78). 
VI. Objections To The CBI-Caribbean 
And U.S. Viewpoints 
It is obvious from the discussion above that 
the CBI has achieved some positive results. 
But, as might be expected, it has not been with-
out its problems. 
From the U.S. viewpoint, the major objec-
tions to the CBI have come from t e labor sec-
tor. Opponents of the CBI feel that American 
workers will lose jobs because of it. This fear 
has been so intense and pervasive that the 
products of several industries (apparel, textile , 
footwear, and leather) were excluded from the 
duty-free provisions of the CBI. Labor leaders 
have argued that the granting of duty-free treat-
ment would endanger these already ailing in-
dustries. However, it should be noted that in-
jured companies and workers are eligible for 
compensation through the provisions of the 
Trade Act of 197 4. This Act specifi es that if in-
creased imports from the Caribbean are found 
to have injured U.S. industry, then the Presi-
dent may suspend or withdraw duty-free treat-
ment for those imports. 
On the other hand, supporters of the CBI 
have countered with the argument that many 
operations which have moved to the Caribbean 
would have moved anyway, if not to the Carib-
bean, then most likely to countries in the Far 
East-countries which already present strong 
competition for the U.S. Frederick Brooks, the 
Chief Executive Officer of MacGregor Sporting 
Goods, Inc., has said that the CBI was instru-
mental in encouraging MacGregor and other 
baseball manufacturers to expand operations in 
Haiti, rather than to pull out as they had initial-
ly planned to do in response to Asian competi-
tion (Lowenstein, 1984, p. 39). Supporters 
have also argued that the CBI may even save 
and create new American jobs. For example, 
Harowe Servo Controls plans to add about 300 
people to its West Chester, Pennsylvania as-
sembly plant to accommodate the increase in 
demand for component parts because of its new 
operation in the Caribbean (Farnsworth, 1984, 
p. D1). 
Apart from the objections of organized 
labor, there is also the risk of a costly failure on 
the part of U.S. companies which invest in the 
Caribbean. Investing in a foreign country usu-
ally requires substantial capital expenditures 
and also carries with it considerable risk since 
the firm is operating in a different cultural, 
economic, and political environment. This situ-
ation is an especially difficult one for firms inex-
perienced in international trade. To mitigate 
these problems, the U.S. government has es-
tablished several services to aid U.S. businesses 
in establishing successful operations in the 
Caribbean. For example, the Department of 
Commerce's Caribbean Basin Business Infor-
mation Center offers business counseling and 
problem-solving services for U.S. companies. It 
also operates a trade and investment informa-
tion data base and participates in the negotia-
tion of bilateral investment treaties to protect 
U.S. investors' rights in the Caribbean. The 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation is a 
U.S. government-owned company which pro-
vides insurance for U.S. investors to cover 
political risks, identifies investment opportun-
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ities, helps appraise investment climates, and in 
some cases even provides for financing. The 
Agency for International Development (AID) 
provides loans and grants to U.S. investing 
companies and furnishes investors with the free 
services of professional Caribbean investment 
and importing specialists. The Caribbean Coun-
cil, a U.S. government service, fosters closer 
American-Caribbean relations through com-
munications and technical assistance. These 
organizations are only a few of those whose 
purpose is to facilitate investment in the Carib-
bean by minimizing the risks involved. (CBI 
Business Information Starter Kit, 1983). 
From the standpoint of many Caribbean 
spokespersons, however, on balance the 
positive effects of the CBI to date have not 
been substantial. This has been due largely to 
the severely depressed condition of many of the 
Caribbean economies. As Bernardo Vega, a con-
sultant and former central bank governor in 
the Dominican Republic, states: "Although the 
CBI is an excellent plan, it has coincided with 
the worst (Caribbean) economic crisis in 45 
years; when we get out of these problems you 
might see the effects of the CBI more quickly" 
(Lowenstein, 1984, p. 39). 
The severity of the region 's economic prob-
lems has in fact led many Caribbean govern-
ment officials to prefer receiving direct develop-
mental aid instead of attracting more invest-
ment. They feel that such aid would go further 
to reindustrialize their economies and to pave 
the way for future trading endeavors once their 
domestic industries are strengthened. It is note-
worthy in this regard that many Caribbean 
countries do not currently possess the neces-
sary infrastructure to accommodate the in-
crease in trade. According to Hugh Marshall, 
an economic official in Antigua, before Antigua 
can realistically attract investors, it needs first 
to expand its telephone system, improve its 
roads, and deepen its harbors. Such improve-
ments require direct development aid (Lowen-
stein, 1984, p. 39). 
Another frequent Caribbean complaint 
about the CBI pertains to its insistence on ide-
ological conformity, namely the exclusion of 
communist/Marxist countries. It is alleged that 
this tends to divide the region, effectively split-
ting the Commonwealth Caribbean States. 
Many Caribbean leaders feel that such divisions 
among Caribbean countries would weaken the 
progress toward regional unity for which Carib-
bean leaders have long been striving. 
Lastly, many critics of the CBI are suspi-
cious of what they perceive to be the real un-
derlying goal of the CBI: the deterrence of 
communism in the region. They further allege 
that the current volume of U.S. aid to Carib-
bean nations is determined more by a country's 
proximity to a communist/Marxist country than 
by that nation's true economic needs. This 
allegation is supported by the fact that while 
U.S. aid to the region doubled from $336 
million in 1980 to $881 million in 1984, most 
of this aid went to Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Costa Rica, all of which are located near Marx-
ist Nicaragua. In fact, tiny Grenada has received 
the largest per capita aid of all countries in the 
region. All this has generated a fair degree of 
suspicion and hostility towards the U.S., an at-
titude which could serve to discourage Carib-
bean nations from embracing the CBI (Lowen-
stein, 1984, p. 39). 
VII. Conclusion 
In light of the discussion above, it is obvi-
ous that the Caribbean Basin Initiative should 
by no means be considered a panacea for the 
problems of the Caribbean economies. Never-
theless, it has the potential to succeed in many 
important ways. It may not have the power to 
deter communism in the region, and it alone 
may not salvage the economies of Caribbean 
nations as its sweeping goals suggest. However, 
it does possess the potential to achieve two im-
portant results-to provide cost savings for 
U.S. companies and to create jobs for Carib-
bean workers. Moreover, it does seem to have 
kindled a small but significant spark of Amer-
ican interest in doing business with Caribbean 
countries. Whether or not the CBI will be suc-
cessful in achieving its goals over the long run 
depends upon the willingness of U.S. and Car-
ibbean businesses to take further advantage of 
this opportunity. 
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